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The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain

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  • Pedro Mendi

    ()
    (School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra)

Abstract

I analyze a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms, where I observe firm and technology characteristics, as well as the type of scheduled payments, whether fixed and/or variable. I find first that technology type influences the chances of the parties reaching an agreement, and second, that the explanations for observed payments based on moral hazard or risk aversion alone are not satisfactory. I argue that all these theories fail to take into account the fact that the contractual relationship is extended along time and that the parties will choose the kind of payments that better estimate the value of the relationship.

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File URL: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom/files/workingpapersmodule/@random437a048e3df62/1132243396_wp0503.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 05/03.

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Length: 40 pages pages
Date of creation: Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2005, 14(2): pp. 403-429
Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp0503

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Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marie-Laure Allain & Margaret K. Kyle & Emeric Henry, 2011. "Inefficiencies in technology transfer: theory and empirics," Sciences Po publications 8206, Sciences Po.
  2. Pedro Mendi, 2007. "Contractual implications of international trade in tacit knowledge," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(9), pages 1173-1183.
  3. Francisco Caballero-sanz & Rafael Moner-colonques & Jose Sempere-monerris, 2005. "Licensing policies for a new product," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(8), pages 697-713.
  4. BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & D’ASPREMONT, Claude & GURIEV, Sergei & SEN, Debapriya, 2012. "Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting," CORE Discussion Papers 2012055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Mendi, Pedro, 2005. "Contracting for the transfer of technology within multinational corporations: Empirical evidence from Spain," IESE Research Papers D/607, IESE Business School.
  6. Krammer, Sorin, 2013. "Assessing the relative importance of multiple channels for embodied and disembodied technological spillovers," MPRA Paper 53676, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Allain, Marie-Laure & Henry, Emeric & Kyle, Margaret K, 2011. "Inefficiencies in technology transfer: theory and empirics," CEPR Discussion Papers 8206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos & Tauman, Yair, 2008. "Licensing of a quality-improving innovation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 410-438, November.
  9. Pierce, Andrea & Sen, Debapriya, 2009. "Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg," MPRA Paper 15673, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Marie-Laure Allain & Emeric Henry & Margaret Kyle, 2011. "Inefficiencies in the sale of ideas: theory and empirics," Working Papers hal-00639128, HAL.
  11. Mendi, Pedro, 2007. "Trade in disembodied technology and total factor productivity in OECD countries," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 121-133, February.

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