This paper searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented technology. There is empirical evidence, drawn from a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms in 1991, that contracts scheduled to last shorter are less likely to include the transfer of know-how. It is also found that technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, so as to mitigate opportunistic behavior on the seller’s side.
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Paper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number
11/04.
Length: 25 pages pages Date of creation: May 2004 Date of revision: Publication status: Published, Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 39: pp. 1173-1183 Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp1104
Find related papers by JEL classification: O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kamien, Morton I., 1992.
"Patent licensing,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354
Elsevier.
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