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Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships

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Author Info
Klein, Benjamin

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Abstract

Court enforcement and private enforcement are not alternative contract enforcement mechanisms but are used jointly by transactors to define the self-enforcing range of a contractual relationship. Within this framework, contract terms economize on the limited amounts of private enforcement capital possessed by transactors, either by directly controlling transactor behavior or by shifting private enforcement capital between transactors to coincide with likely future market conditions. Hold-ups occur when market conditions change sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self-enforcing range. This probabilistic view of hold-ups is contrasted with opportunism more generally and with moral hazard behavior. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 34 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 444-63
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:34:y:1996:i:3:p:444-63

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  1. Jeffrey B. Miller & Kenneth Koford, 2005. "Contract Enforcement in the Early Transition to a Market Economy," Working Papers 05-11, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Claro, Danny P. & Claro, Priscila, 2007. "Trust in Channel Relationships: Calculative, Affective, Belief and Performance," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_97, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andreas Roider, 2006. "Fisher Body revisited: Supply contracts and vertical integration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 181-196, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Benito Arruñada & Manuel González, 1997. "How Competition Controls Team Production: The Case of Fishing Firms," Economics Working Papers 261, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  5. Henry Ergas & Teresa Fels & Jason Soon, 2004. "Exclusive Licensing in Harbour Towage," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 3(2), pages 145-167, June. [Downloadable!]
  6. Maze, Armelle, 2006. "Multilateral reputation mechanisms and contract law in agriculture : complement or substitutes," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21285, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  7. Mendi, Pedro, 2005. "Contracting for the transfer of technology within multinational corporations: Empirical evidence from Spain," IESE Research Papers D/607, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  8. Maze, Armelle, 2002. "Learning Process and Contract Adaptation with Quality Uncertainty: Some Paradoxes in Retailer-Producer Relationships," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24957, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  9. Yu, Xiaohua & Abler, David & Peng, Chao, 2008. "Dancing with the Dragon Heads: Enforcement, Innovations and Efficiency of Contracts between Agricultural Processors and Farmers in China," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6144, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  10. Oliver Hart, 2007. "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 13540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Benjamin Klein & Joshua Wright, . "The Antitrust Law and Economics of Category Management," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1069, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  12. Cocks, Jack & Gow, Hamish R. & Dunn, Daniel J., 2003. "Meeting Private Grades And Standards In Transition Agriculture: Experiences From The Armenian Dairy Industry," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22144, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  13. repec:bep:eaptop:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1156-1156 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Gow, H.R. & Swinnen, J., 2002. "Investment, and Contract Hold-Ups in Transition: Evidence from Hungary," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24853, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  15. Cocks, Jack & Gow, Hamish & Westgren, Randall, 2005. "Public Facilitation of Small Farmer Access to International Food Marketing Channels: An Empirical Analysis of the USDA Market Assistance Program in Armenia," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19295, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  16. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, 1999. "The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Francine Lafontaine & Scott E. Masten, 2002. "Contracting in the Absence of Specific Investments and Moral Hazard: Understanding Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking," NBER Working Papers 8859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Beckmann, Volker & Boger, Silke, 2003. "Courts And Contract Enforcement In Agricultural Transition - Theory And Evidence From Poland," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22213, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  19. Beckmann, Volker & Boger, Silke, 2003. "Courts And Contract Enforcement In Transition Agriculture: Theory And Evidence From Poland," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25878, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Benito Arruñada, 2000. "The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers: An Efficiency Hypothesis of Their Relation with Suppliers," Economics Working Papers 445, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  21. Lazzarini, Sergio G., 2002. "Moving out of Committed Relationships," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_31, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  22. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1997. "Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Pedro Mendi, 2004. "Contractual Implications of International Trade in Tacit Knowledge," Faculty Working Papers 11/04, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Oliver, Lance D. & Gow, Hamish R., 2002. "Successful Alliance Establishment And Evolution In A Volatile Business Environment: The Case Of "Cellars Of Canterbury"," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19808, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
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