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Inventor moral hazard in university licensing: The role of contracts

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  • Dechenaux, Emmanuel
  • Thursby, Jerry
  • Thursby, Marie

Abstract

Abstract We examine commonly observed forms of payment, such as milestones, royalties, or consulting contracts as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions. Our theoretical model shows that when milestones are feasible, royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is risk averse. The model also predicts the use of consulting contracts which improve the firm's ability to monitor inventor effort. Because these contracts increase the firm's expected profits, the upfront fee that the university can charge is higher than otherwise. These results therefore support the commonly observed university policy of allowing faculty to consult with licensing firms outside of their university contracts. They also support firm policies of including milestones. An empirical analysis based on a survey of 112 businesses that license-in university inventions supports the complementarity of milestones and consulting suggested by the theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research Policy.

Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 94-104

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Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:40:y:2011:i:1:p:94-104

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/respol

Related research

Keywords: University licensing Milestone payments Consulting Bayh-Dole act;

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References

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  1. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2003. "Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University-Industry Licensing," NBER Working Papers 9991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Choi, Jay Pil, 1996. "Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 22, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  3. Marie Thursby & Jerry Thursby & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2005. "Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts," NBER Working Papers 11128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 99.
  5. Bousquet, Alain & Cremer, Helmuth & Ivaldi, Marc & Wolkowicz, Michel, 1998. "Risk sharing in licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 535-554, September.
  6. Aghion, P. & Tirole, J., 1993. "On the Management of Innovation," Working papers 93-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, 2008. "Incentives and invention in universities," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 403-433.
  8. Partha, Dasgupta & David, Paul A., 1994. "Toward a new economics of science," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 487-521, September.
  9. Thursby, Marie & Thursby, Jerry & Gupta-Mukherjee, Swasti, 2007. "Are there real effects of licensing on academic research? A life cycle view," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 577-598, August.
  10. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Martinez-Giralt, Xavier & David Perez-Castrillo, J., 1996. "The role of information in licensing contract design," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 43-57, January.
  11. Thursby, Jerry G & Jensen, Richard & Thursby, Marie C, 2001. " Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 26(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
  12. John Beath & Robert Owen & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & David Ulph, 2000. "Optimal Incentives for Income-Generation within Universities," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 200007, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
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  14. Perkmann, Markus & Walsh, Kathryn, 2008. "Engaging the scholar: Three types of academic consulting and their impact on universities and industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 1884-1891, December.
  15. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2002. "Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(1), pages 90-104, January.
  16. Levin, Sharon G & Stephan, Paula E, 1991. "Research Productivity over the Life Cycle: Evidence for Academic Scientists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 114-32, March.
  17. Macho-Stadler Inés & Pérez-Castrillo David & Veugelers Reinhilde, 2007. "Designing Contracts for University Spin-offs," Working Papers 201071, Fundacion BBVA / BBVA Foundation.
  18. Thursby, Jerry & Fuller, Anne W. & Thursby, Marie, 2009. "US faculty patenting: Inside and outside the university," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 14-25, February.
  19. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1989. "The Economics of Uncertainty and Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121360, December.
  20. Richard Jensen & Jerry Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2010. "University-Industry Spillovers, Government Funding, and Industrial Consulting," NBER Working Papers 15732, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Di Gregorio, Dante & Shane, Scott, 2003. "Why do some universities generate more start-ups than others?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 209-227, February.
  22. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209, November.
  23. Jeannette Colyvas & Michael Crow & Annetine Gelijns & Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson & Nathan Rosenberg & Bhaven N. Sampat, 2002. "How Do University Inventions Get Into Practice?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(1), pages 61-72, January.
  24. Anand, Bharat N & Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 103-35, March.
  25. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, 2007. "University licensing," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 620-639, Winter.
  26. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 2007. "Licensing of university inventions: The role of a technology transfer office," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 483-510, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Козырев А.Н. & Неволин И. В., 2013. "Применение Алгоритма Решения Задачи Об Оптимальном Распределении Ресурсов К Проблеме Назначения Цены За Ис�," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 49(3), pages 57-68, июль.
  2. Crama, Pascale & De Reyck, Bert & Degraeve, Zeger, 2013. "Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R&D licensing contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(3), pages 572-582.
  3. Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika & Thursby, Marie, 2012. "University Entrepreneurship and Professor Privilege," Working Paper Series 909, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 12 Apr 2012.
  4. Muscio, Alessandro & Quaglione, Davide & Vallanti, Giovanna, 2013. "Does government funding complement or substitute private research funding to universities?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-75.

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