This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship that is susceptible to the moral hazard problem. The optimal contractual form of licensing derived in the model generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice. For instance, the introduction of inputs that are not contractible and costly explains the prevalence of royalty contracts in the licensing relationship. Moreover, the model is able to relate the size of the royalty rate to the parameters that represent the environments under which the concerned parties operate. The framework also provides a rigorous evaluation of the recent debate on the issue of technology licensing and competitiveness in the global economy. In addition, the difficulty that the licensor faces in controlling the use of information in the development of related products in the future can also explain the rationale for including grant-back clauses in licensing contracts. Finally, the model can be naturally extended to analyze the choice of a technology holder between direct investment and licensing in an attempt to serve a foreign market.
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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number
22.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kamien, Morton I., 1992.
"Patent licensing,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354
Elsevier.
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