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The Role of Risk in Contract Choice

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Author Info
Allen, Douglas W
Lueck, Dean

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Abstract

Structuring contracts to share risk in light of incentive problems is the central premise of contract theory, yet the risk-sharing implications have rarely been thoroughly tested using micro-level contract data. In this article we test the major implications of a principal-agent model of contracts using detailed data on more than 4,000 individual contracts from modern North American agriculture. On a case-by-case basis, our evidence fails to support the standard principal-agent model with risk aversion as an explanation of contract choice in modern North American farming. At the same time, we find some support for models that assume risk-neutral contracting parties and stress multiple margins for moral hazard and enforcement costs. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 704-36
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:704-36

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