Ramón Faulí-Oller () (Universidad de Alicante) Joel Sandonís () (Universidad de Alicante)
Abstract
In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal to the industry patentee. We show that a merger is profitable only for the case of small innovations whereas only large innovations make it welfare improving. As a consequence, the antitrust authority should forbid all (profitable) mergers.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
2003-17.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kamien, Morton I., 1992.
"Patent licensing,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354
Elsevier.
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