Strategic Implications of Learning by Doing
AbstractThis paper examines firm strategy when competitors are at different points along the learning curve. It shows that firms high on the learning curve will have strong incentives to exclude new competitors, while firms that are learning more slowly will have weaker incentives to hinder new competitors and may even wish to encourage entry. The same strategies are shown to apply when firm reputation is acquired through participation in an industry. Several examples of strategic behaviour that take advantage of differential learning speeds or heterogeneous reputations are suggested and a variety of applications of the principle involved are explored.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal International Journal of the Economics of Business.
Volume (Year): 9 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CIJB20
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-41, December.
- Yi, Sang-Seung, 1999. "Entry, licensing and research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T., 1987.
"Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt4zr9b9dr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T, 1988. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 673-94, November.
- Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini., 1987. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Economics Working Papers 8760, University of California at Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini., 1986. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Economics Working Papers 8618, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T., 1986. "Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8zs1p5cc, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
- Mukesh Eswaran, 1994. "Licensees as Entry Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 673-88, August.
- Kathleen R. Conner, 1995. "Obtaining Strategic Advantage from Being Imitated: When Can Encouraging "Clones" Pay?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(2), pages 209-225, February.
- Seabright, Paul, 1996. "The starfish effect: Can market entry by one firm encourage further entry by others?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 541-550, April.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1996.
"Network externalities, complementarities, and invitations to enter,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 211-233, September.
- Nicholas Economides, 1997. "Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitations to Enter," Industrial Organization 9701004, EconWPA.
- Peter Thompson, 2012. "The Relationship between Unit Cost and Cumulative Quantity and the Evidence for Organizational Learning-by-Doing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 203-24, Summer.
- Nisvan Erkal, 2004.
"Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
894, The University of Melbourne.
- Nisvan Erkal, 2005. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 81(252), pages 51-60, 03.
- Peter Thompson, 2008. "Learning by Doing," Working Papers 0806, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.