Licensees as Entry Barriers
AbstractIn a more general setting than has been considered hitherto, this paper examines how the incumbent in a market threatened by entry can exploit its first-mover advantage by licensing its technology not to a potential entrant but to firms that would have remained outside the industry. It is shown, among other things, that the incumbent may subsidize the variable costs of its licensees in order to deter entry. Even when entry is not deterred, it is demonstrated that the incumbent might opt to invite outsiders as licensees.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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