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On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition

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Author Info
Sougata Poddar
Uday Bhanu Sinha

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Abstract

We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in a linear city framework where firms compete in price. We show that offering royalty is best for an outsider patentee for both drastic and non-drastic innovations. For an insider patentee, offering no license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic. The incentive for innovation is higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. The overall increase in welfare due to an innovation is the same for both outsider and insider patentees. Copyright © 2004 Economic Society of Australia..

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The Economic Society of Australia in its journal The Economic Record.

Volume (Year): 80 (2004)
Issue (Month): 249 (06)
Pages: 208-218
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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:80:y:2004:i:249:p:208-218

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Choi, Jay Pil, 2001. "Technology transfer with moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 249-266, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 2002. "Patent Licensing: The Inside Story," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(1), pages 7-15, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Oz Shy & Jacques-Françlois Thisse, 1999. "A Strategic Approach to Software Protection," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 163-190, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Beggs, A. W., 1992. "The licensing of patents under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 171-191, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Muto Shigeo, 1993. "On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 257-267, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sougata Poddar & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2002. "The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing," Departmental Working Papers wp0211, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nisvan Erkal, 2004. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 894, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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