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• Carl Shapiro

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 75 (1985)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 25-30
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:2:p:25-30

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Luigi Filippini, 2006. "Cournot competition among multiproduct firms:specialization through licensing," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0542, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
2. Choi, Jay Pil, 1996. "Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 22, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Choi, J.P., 1995. "Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 1995_16, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
   • Choi, Jay Pil, 2001. "Technology transfer with moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 249-266, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Jay Pil Choi, 1999. "A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The Boomerang Effect and Grant-Back Clauses," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jay Pil Choi, 1999. "A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses," Working Paper Series no16, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University. [Downloadable!]
   • Jay Pil Choi, 2002. "A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 203-229, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Jay Pil Choi, 2003. "Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
5. Judy Hsu & X. Henry Wang, 2004. "On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(6), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
6. Alka Chadha & Åke Blomqvist, 2005. "Patent Races, “Me-Too” Drugs, and Generics: A Developing-World Perspective," Departmental Working Papers wp0513, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Ines Macho-stadler & David Perez-castrillo, 1991. "Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 24, pages 08, Octobre-D. [Downloadable!]
8. Harabi, Najib, 1996. "Patents in Theory and Practice: Empirical Results from Switzerland," MPRA Paper 9606, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
9. Marie Thursby & Jerry Thursby & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2005. "Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts," NBER Working Papers 11128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Thursby, Marie & Thursby, Jerry, 2009. "Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of university license contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 80-91, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2008. "On the possibility of licensing in a market with logit demand functions," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(17), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
11. Nisvan Erkal, 2004. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 894, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Nisvan Erkal, 2005. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 81(252), pages 51-60, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1988. "Dynamic R&D Competition," NBER Working Papers 1674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1987. "Dynamic R&D Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 372-87, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Georg von Graevenitz, 2005. "Integrating Competition Policy and Innovation Policy: The Case of R&D Cooperation," Industrial Organization 0503006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Georg von Graevenitz, 2005. "Integrating competition policy and innovation policy: the case of R&D cooperation," Discussion Papers 35, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

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