This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Vasiliki Skreta
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Skreta/Skreta345.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number 345.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 28 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:345

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Tim Kwok).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
  2. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gale, Ian, 1990. "A multiple-object auction with superadditive values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 323-328, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, E., 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    Other versions:
  7. repec:att:wimass:19908 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are over 21000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.