Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities
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Other versions of this item:
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities," UCLA Economics Online Papers 345, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2004. "Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 287, Econometric Society.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-829, September.
- Mark Armstrong, 2000. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 455-481.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January.
- Gale, Ian, 1990.
"A multiple-object auction with superadditive values,"
Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 323-328, December.
- Gale, I., 1990. "A Multiple-Object Auction With Superadditive Values," Working papers 9008, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kumru, Cagri & Yektas, Hadi, 2008. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," MPRA Paper 7575, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005.
"Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsOptimal Auctions; Multiple Objects; Externalities; Mechanism Design;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-12-01 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-12-01 (Microeconomics)
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