Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Miller, Nolan

    (Harvard U)

  • Pratt, John H.

    (Harvard U)

  • Zeckhauser, Richard

    (Harvard U)

  • Johnson, Scott

    (Australian National U)

Abstract

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures balanced transfers exist that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful. This paper extends the analysis of KSG RWP03-020.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-028/$File/rwp_06_028_miller_zeckhauser_rev2.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-028/$File/rwp_06_028_miller_zeckhauser_rev2.pdf [302 Found]--> http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/Index.aspx). If this is indeed the case, please notify ()
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government in its series Working Paper Series with number rwp06-028.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-028

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Fax: 617-496-2554
Web page: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
  2. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. RICHARD McLEAN & ANDREW POSTLEWAITE, 2004. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 809-827, 07.
  4. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  5. Reinhard Selten, 1998. "Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 43-61, June.
  6. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, 05.
  7. Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  8. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-59, September.
  9. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, 09.
  10. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 142-151, March.
  11. d'ASPREMONT , C. & GERARD VARET, L.-A., . "Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs," CORE Discussion Papers RP -481, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Meirowitz, Adam, 2003. "On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 213-218, February.
  14. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01.
  15. d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1990. "Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 233-254, August.
  16. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  17. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
  18. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June.
  19. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
  21. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  22. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  23. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  24. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1990. "Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 109-112, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P., 2013. "Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach," MPRA Paper 44236, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2010. "Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2260-2281, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-028. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.