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On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions

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  • Compte, Olivier

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0829.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0829

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  1. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1996. "Strategic Nonparticipation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 84-98, Spring.
  3. Jeroen M. Swinkels & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 499-525, June.
  4. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1998. "Prices and the Winners Curse," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. ehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1994. "How (not) to sell nuclear weapons," Discussion Paper Serie B 288, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. Gul, Faruk & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1273-92, November.
  7. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Claudio Weber Abramo, 2003. "Prevention and detection in bribery-affected public procurement," Public Economics, EconWPA 0309001, EconWPA.
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  4. Gino Loyola, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," Economics Working Papers we083318, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. Marco Pagnozzi, 2006. "Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions?," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 169, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  6. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2004. "Piecewise procurement of a large-scale project," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1349-1375, November.
  7. Cingottini, Ilaria & Menicucci, Domenico, 2006. "On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 260-266, May.

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