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Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction

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  • Gresik, Thomas A.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 55 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 41-63

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:55:y:1991:i:1:p:41-63

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Cited by:
  1. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Auctions and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1175-1204.
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2004. "Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-291, August.
  5. Peters,M. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Internet auctions with many traders," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Claudio Mezzetti, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/1, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Mar 2006.
  7. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2008. "An ascending double auction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 281-306, November.
  9. Serkan Kucuksenel, 2012. "Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 83-93, May.
  10. Dang, Tri Vi, 2008. "Bargaining with endogenous information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 339-354, May.
  11. Tian, Guoqiang, 1997. "Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 313-339, October.

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