In this paper, we study efficient dissolution of partnerships in a context of incomplete information. We generalize the results of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) to situations where the partnership takes on a common value that may depend upon all partners' types, so that each partner's individual rationality constraint depends on types other than his own. We show that in this case not only the distribution of ownership, emphasized in the earlier literature, but also the distribution of control within an organization matter in determining the possibility of efficient dissolution. We underscore this point by showing that two-person partnerships where one partner exercises complete control cannot be dissolved efficiently with any incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism, regardless of the ownership structure
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008.
"What to Put on the Table,"
Working Papers
08-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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