Trade of Permits for Greenhouse Emissions; Bilateral Trade Need not Be the Answer
AbstractThe Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 allowing international emissions trading. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identitydependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for, and may even prevent, an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which efficient allocations are the only allocations immune to bilateral trade. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that market design matters.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 163.
Date of creation: 0000
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Terms of Trade; asymmetric externalities; permits trade;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
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- Copeland, Brian R. & Taylor, M. Scott, 2005.
"Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 205-234, March.
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- Cason Timothy N., 1993. "Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 177-195, September.
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