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Trade of Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Bilateral Trade Need not be the Answer

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  • Roberto Burguet
  • Jaume Sempere

Abstract

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.
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  • Roberto Burguet & Jaume Sempere, 2010. "Trade of Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Bilateral Trade Need not be the Answer," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 495-509, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:46:y:2010:i:4:p:495-509
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9351-z
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    4. Richard Schmalensee & Paul L. Joskow & A. Denny Ellerman & Juan Pablo Montero & Elizabeth M. Bailey, 1998. "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 53-68, Summer.
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    7. Springer, Urs, 2003. "The market for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: a survey of model studies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 527-551, September.
    8. Bagwell, Kyle & Mavroidis, Petros C. & Staiger, Robert W., 2007. "Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 309-332, November.
    9. Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 1999. "The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible," Papers of Peter Cramton 99eedecr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Feb 1998.
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    Cited by:

    1. José-María Da-Rocha & Jaume Sempere, 2017. "ITQs, Firm Dynamics and Wealth Distribution: Does Full Tradability Increase Inequality?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(2), pages 249-273, October.
    2. Elvio Accinelli & Leobardo Plata & Martín Puchet, 2007. "Can a reallocation of initial endowments improve social welfare?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0807, Department of Economics - dECON.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terms-of-trade; Asymmetric externalities; Permits trade; D62; F18;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment

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