This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Behavioral Heterogeneity in the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Olivier Rousse ()
Benoît Sévi ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

At present, it is widely recognized that under the hypothesis of perfect market, a system of emission permits is a flexible instrument to attain an environmental objective at least aggregate cost. Unfortunately, perfect market assumptions rarely hold in practice. Indeed, emission permits markets can suffer of several impediments such as uncertainties, high transaction costs, market power, imperfect monitoring and enforcement. In this paper, we focus our attention on uncertainty. In a marketable permits market, firms may face various kind of uncertainty like permit price uncertainty, demand uncertainty that means production and emissions uncertainty, abatement costs uncertainty, and regulatory uncertainty. Assuming that the overall uncertainty is included in the permits price uncertainty (which is a reasonable assumption even if in previous contributions, other uncertainties were assumed to capture the whole risk ), we provide an analytical explanation of banking, using the concept of prudence developed by Kimball (1990). We show that prudence behaviour is a sufficient condition for the firm to save permits in portfolio (equivalent to a precautionary premium) and that the number of permits saved in portfolio decreases when interest rate increases. Results are not so far from previous literature and seem to indicate that uncertainty has disturbing effects on trading. Prudent behaviours of regulated firms lessen trade volumes in emissions permits markets and seem to indicate that possible welfare gains exist from governmental intervention (trading pro-actively in the emission permits market as mentioned by Baldursson and von der Fehr (2004) for instance). The more interesting point of the paper is the estimation of prudence provided using data from the US Acid Rain Program (Phase II, 2000-2004). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to measure prudence in a production framework, compared to works estimating prudence in a consumption framework (Guiso, Jappelli, Terlizzese (1996), Lusardi (1997,1998), Parker (1999) among others\footnote{Eisenhauer & Ventura (2003, 2004) and Halek & Eisenhauer (2001) may also be cited.}) or using experimental data (Eisenhauer(2000) or Miyata (2003)). Particularly, trade level are put in perspective with the structure (utilities or not, number of units owned, total revenues,...) of the firm to assess if there is a form of corporate prudence. Corporate prudence is no more than a form of corporate hedging if we consider permits as forward contracts following Maeda & Tezuka(2004). Discriminant characteristics are also discussed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-sre.wu-wien.ac.at/ersa/ersaconfs/ersa05/papers/550.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Regional Science Association in its series ERSA conference papers with number ersa05p550.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa05p550

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Augasse 2-6, 1090 Vienna, Austria
Web page: http://www.ersa.org

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Gunther Maier).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rubin, Jonathan D., 1996. "A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 269-286, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin Browning & Annamaria Lusardi, 1996. "Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts," Discussion Papers 96-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  5. Schmalensee, Richard, et al, 1998. "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 53-68, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bohi, Douglas R. & Burtraw, Dallas, 1997. "SO2 allowance trading: How do expectations and experience measure up?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(7), pages 67-75. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Christian Gollier, 2004. "The Economics of Risk and Time," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262572249.
  8. Considine, Timothy J. & Larson, Donald F.
    , 2004. "The environment as a factor of production," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3271, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Hahn, Robert W. & May, Carol A., 1994. "The behavior of the allowance market: Theory and evidence," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 28-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Holthausen, Duncan M, 1979. "Hedging and the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 989-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. J. Albrecht & T. Verbeke & M. De Clercq, 2004. "Informational efficiency of the US SO2 permit market," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 04/250, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lusardi, Annamaria, 1998. "On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 449-53, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Joskow, Paul L & Schmalensee, Richard & Bailey, Elizabeth M, 1998. "The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 669-85, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Cason, Timothy N & Gangadharan, Lata, 2003. "Transactions Costs in Tradable Permit Markets: An Experimental Study of Pollution Market Designs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 145-65, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Keeler, Andrew G., 1991. "Noncompliant firms in transferable discharge permit markets: Some extensions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 180-189, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Stuart Mestelman & Andrew Muller, 1997. "Emissions Trading with Shares and Coupons when Control over Discharges is Uncertain," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1997-01, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Hahn, Robert W, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 753-65, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Skinner, Jonathan, 1988. "Risky income, life cycle consumption, and precautionary savings," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 237-255, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Malik, Arun S., 2002. "Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 371-390, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Curtis Carlson & Dallas Burtraw & Maureen Cropper & Karen L. Palmer, 2000. "Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1292-1326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Arimura, Toshi H., 2002. "An Empirical Study of the SO2 Allowance Market: Effects of PUC Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 271-289, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Cronshaw, Mark B & Brown-Kruse, Jamie, 1996. "Regulated Firms in Pollution Permit Markets with Banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 179-89, March.
  27. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521023894 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Ellerman, A. Denny & Montero, Juan-Pablo, 1998. "The Declining Trend in Sulfur Dioxide Emissions: Implications for Allowance Prices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 26-45, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Cason Timothy N., 1993. "Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 177-195, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Joskow, Paul L & Schmalensee, Richard, 1998. "The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-83, April.
  31. Baldursson, Fridrik M & von der Fehr, N.-H.M.Nils-Henrik M, 2004. "Price volatility and risk exposure: on market-based environmental policy instruments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 682-704, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Mark Kazarosian, 1997. "Precautionary Savings-A Panel Study," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(2), pages 241-247, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  33. Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-148, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Louis Eeckhoudt & Christian Gollier, 2005. "The impact of prudence on optimal prevention," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 989-994, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Hennessy, David A. & Roosen, Jutta, 1999. "Stochastic Pollution, Permits, and Merger Incentives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 211-232, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  36. Misiolek, Walter S. & Elder, Harold W., 1989. "Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 156-166, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  37. van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  38. Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2005. "A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 159-173, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  39. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Haan, Marco, 2001. "Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 286-294, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  40. Cason, Timothy N, 1995. "An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 905-22, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also covers the most complete directory of Economics departments and institutes, EDIRC.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.