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A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

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Author Info
Matti Liski
Juan-Pablo Montero

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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on the equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and a competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations. We find, for example, that if the large firm enjoys a dominant position in the after-banking market, this position gets extended to the market during the banking period regardless of the allocation of the stock (bank) of permits.

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Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research in its series Working Papers with number 0405.

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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:mee:wpaper:0405

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Newbery, David M G, 1981. "Oil Prices, Cartels, and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 617-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard J. Gilbert, 1978. "Dominant Firm Pricing Policy in a Market for an Exhaustible Resource," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 385-395, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Juan Pablo Montero, 2002. "The Temporal Efficiency of SO2 Emissions Trading," Documentos de Trabajo 225, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Hahn, Robert W, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 753-65, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-61, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cronshaw, Mark B & Brown-Kruse, Jamie, 1996. "Regulated Firms in Pollution Permit Markets with Banking," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 179-89, March.
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  1. repec:mop:credwp:06.02.63 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Olivier Rousse & Benoît Sévi, 2005. "Behavioral Heterogeneity in the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program," ERSA conference papers ersa05p550, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  3. Julien Pierre Chevallier, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-18, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
  4. Matti Liski & Juan Pablo Montero, 2005. "Market Power in a Storable-Good Market: Theory and Applications to Carbon and Sulfur Trading," Documentos de Trabajo 304, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Emanuele Massetti, 2008. "Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2004. "Markets for environmental protection: design and performance incomplete enforcement," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 31(1 Year 20), pages 79-99, June. [Downloadable!]
  7. Juan Pablo Montero, 2004. "Markets for Environmental Protection; Desing and Performance," Documentos de Trabajo 269, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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