Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power: A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model
AbstractIn international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the suboptimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered permits by the regulator based on recent emissions might pave the way for dominant positions. Stemming from this politically given market imperfection, this chapter develops a differential Stackelberg game with two types of non cooperative agents: a large potentially dominant agent, and a competitive fringe whose size are exogenously determined. The strategic interactions are modeled on an intra-industry permits markets where agents can freely bank and borrow permits. This chapter contributes to the debate on initial permits allocation and market power by focusing on the effects of allowing banking and borrowing. A documented appraisal on whether or not such provisions should be included is frequently overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Numerical simulations provide a quantitative illustration of the results obtained.
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Emissions Trading; Banking; Borrowing; Market Power.;
Other versions of this item:
- Chevallier, Julien, 2011. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power : A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4601, Paris Dauphine University.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-05-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2009-05-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2009-05-30 (Regulation)
- NEP-RES-2009-05-30 (Resource Economics)
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