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Regulated Firms in Pollution Permit Markets with Banking

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Author Info
Cronshaw, Mark B
Brown-Kruse, Jamie
Abstract

This paper examines a competitive intertemporal market for bankable emission permits, such as sulfur dioxide allowances. Without profit regulation, firms are willing to bank permits if permit prices rise over time with the rate of interest, but will not bank if prices rise more slowly. The market achieves aggregate emission targets at least total cost if there is not profit regulation, but may not do so if firms are subject to profit regulation. Firms must arbitrage differences both in abatement cost and in the regulatory treatment of permits to achieve least total cost. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 179-89
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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:9:y:1996:i:2:p:179-89

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  1. A. Denny Ellerman & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2005. "The Efficiency and Robustness of Allowance Banking in the U.S. Acid Rain Program," Working Papers 0505, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hongli Feng & Jinhua Zhao, 2002. "Alternative Intertemporal Permit Trading Regimes with Stochastic Abatement Costs," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 02-wp318, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Paul Leiby & Jonathan Rubin, 2001. "Intertemporal Permit Trading for the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(3), pages 229-256, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Daniel Phaneuf & Till Requate, 2002. "Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(3), pages 369-390, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Morten Søberg, 2000. "Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental evaluation," Discussion Papers 280, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
  6. repec:mop:credwp:06.02.63 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Olivier Rousse & Benoît Sévi, 2005. "Behavioral Heterogeneity in the US Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program," ERSA conference papers ersa05p550, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  8. Carlo Carraro & Valentina Bosetti & Emanuele Massetti, 2008. "Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects," Working Papers 2008_01, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Pierre-André Jouvet & Philippe Michel & Gilles Rotillon, 2004. "Optimal growth with pollution : how to use pollution permits ?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04012, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen, 2003. "The Paparazzi Take a Look at a Living Legend: The SO2 Cap-and-Trade Program for Power Plants in the United States," Discussion Papers dp-03-15, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  11. Matti Liski & Juan Pablo Montero, 2003. "A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking," Documentos de Trabajo 236, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2007. "Tradable deficit permits: a way to ensure sub-national fiscal discipline?," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-17, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
  13. Pizer, William & Newell, Richard & Zhang, Jiangfeng, 2003. "Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices," Discussion Papers dp-03-34, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Considine, Timothy J. & Larson, Donald F.
    , 2004. "The environment as a factor of production," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3271, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Juan Pablo Montero, 2002. "The Temporal Efficiency of SO2 Emissions Trading," Documentos de Trabajo 225, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
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