Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction
AbstractCason (1993)argued thattheauction theEPAused in order to start the market for sulfur allowances, is not efficient. The set-up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance. In this paper, we show that the sellersâ incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested. In particular, we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero, while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. It is not possible to derive the Nash equilibrium for this set-up. If such an equilibrium exists, sellers either set only a positive ask price, or an ask price equal to zero, and a positive bid as well.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 41 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
Other versions of this item:
- Dijkstra, B.R. & Haan, M., 1999. "Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction," Research Report, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management) 99C08, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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