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Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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Author Info
Claudio Mezzetti

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Abstract

Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals, or types, of all agents. Under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome-decision payoffs, previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals, efficient design is impossible. This paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome (e.g., allocation of the goods) is determined, then the agents observe their own outcome-decision payoffs, and then final transfers are made. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 72 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
Pages: 1617-1626
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:5:p:1617-1626

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  1. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, 2006. "The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation," NBER Working Papers 12645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dash, Rajdeep K & Giovannucci, Andrea & Jennings, Nicholas R. & Mezzetti, Claudio & Ramchurn, Sarvapali D. & Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A., 2008. "Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 880, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Claudio Mezzetti, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction," Discussion Papers in Economics 05/1, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Mar 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Miller, Nolan & Pratt, John H. & Zeckhauser, Richard & Johnson, Scott, 2006. "Mechanism Design with Multidimensional, Continuous Types and Interdependent Valuations," Working Paper Series rwp06-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000379, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001134, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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