A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies
AbstractIn this not we show that the results developed in Singh and Vives (1984) are sensitive to the duopoly assumtion (Rand Journal of Economics 15, 546-554). If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than unde quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality fims may earn higher profits unde price competion than under quantity competition. Hence, it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 1999:9.
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 17 Aug 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, pages 233-239.
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Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
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Product Differentiation; Oligopoly; Cournot; Bertrand;
Other versions of this item:
- Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2000-01-24 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2000-01-24 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
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