This paper examines how product market competition affects firms’ timing of adopting a new technology as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives. It shows that adoption dates differ not only among symmetric firms but also among markets with Cournot and Bertrand competition. More specifically, Cournot competition can lead to earlier adoption than Bertrand competition. It shows also that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives. When goods are differentiated enough, adoption occurs later than it is socially optimal.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2686.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
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