Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe

Contents:

Author Info

  • Albert Breton
  • Heinrich Ursprung

Abstract

The traditional school of economic policy analysis predicts that globalisation will give rise to predatory competition between the governments of the European nation states. The consequence is anticipated to be a marked reduction in, if not the destruction of, the benevolent Welfare State. The objective of this contribution is to present the main arguments that have led us to believe that, this traditional literature notwithstanding, a European constitution should not restrict but rather should encourage horizontal and vertical governmental competition. In our view the European political order, in defining the relationship among member states and also the relationship between the member states and the EU, ought to be inspired by what we know about competition in the commercial sphere.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2002/wp-cesifo-2002-01/657.PDF
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 657.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_657

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: globalisation; globalization;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Michael Keen, 1997. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers 97/173, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Bretschger, Lucas & Hettich, Frank, 2000. "Globalisation, capital mobility and tax competition: Theory and evidence for OECD countries," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 07/2000, Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
  3. Breton,Albert, 1996. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521481021.
  4. Zantman, W., 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ 00-540, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  5. Dennis Mueller, 1998. "Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 171-186, September.
  6. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  7. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
  8. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
  9. Breton, Albert & Fraschini, Angela, 2003. " Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 57-77, January.
  10. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
  11. Günther G. Schulze & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. "Globalisation of the Economy and the Nation State," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 295-352, 05.
  12. Feld, Lars P, 2000. " Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
  13. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
  14. Schulze, Gunther G. & Ursprung, Heinrich W. (ed.), 2001. "International Environmental Economics: A Survey of the Issues," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297666, October.
  15. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
  16. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19854, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  17. Burgoon, Brian, 2001. "Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that Bind," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(03), pages 509-551, June.
  18. Sankar, . Ulaganathan (ed.), 2001. "Environmental Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195659139, October.
  19. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293.
  20. Roger H. Gordon, 1982. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," NBER Working Papers 1004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. SALMON, Pierre, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne 2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  2. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 993, CESifo Group Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_657. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.