Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe
AbstractThe traditional school of economic policy analysis predicts that globalisation will give rise to predatory competition between the governments of the European nation states. The consequence is anticipated to be a marked reduction in, if not the destruction of, the benevolent Welfare State. The objective of this contribution is to present the main arguments that have led us to believe that, this traditional literature notwithstanding, a European constitution should not restrict but rather should encourage horizontal and vertical governmental competition. In our view the European political order, in defining the relationship among member states and also the relationship between the member states and the EU, ought to be inspired by what we know about competition in the commercial sphere.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 657.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
- Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2004.
"Economic Integration and Political Accountability,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Zantman, W., 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers 00-540, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Sand-Zantman, W., 2003. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2003.09, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bretschger, Lucas & Hettich, Frank, 2000.
"Globalisation, capital mobility and tax competition: Theory and evidence for OECD countries,"
07/2000, Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
- Bretschger, Lucas & Hettich, Frank, 2002. "Globalisation, capital mobility and tax competition: theory and evidence for OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 695-716, November.
- Michael Keen, 1997.
"Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism,"
IMF Working Papers
97/173, International Monetary Fund.
- Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roger H. Gordon, 1982.
"An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism,"
NBER Working Papers
1004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 247-274, November.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1987.
"Decentralization as an incentive scheme,"
Institut des MathÃ©matiques Economiques â Document de travail de lâI.M.E. (1974-1993)
98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Breton,Albert, 1996. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521481021, October.
- Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
- Günther G. Schulze & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. "Globalisation of the Economy and the Nation State," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 295-352, 05.
- Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980.
"The Power to Tax,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293, October.
- Dennis Mueller, 1998. "Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 171-186, September.
- Burgoon, Brian, 2001. "Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that Bind," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(03), pages 509-551, June.
- Breton, Albert & Fraschini, Angela, 2003. " Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 57-77, January.
- Schulze, Gunther G. & Ursprung, Heinrich W. (ed.), 2001. "International Environmental Economics: A Survey of the Issues," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297666.
- Feld, Lars P, 2000. " Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
- Sankar, . Ulaganathan (ed.), 2001. "Environmental Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195659139.
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
- SALMON, Pierre, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 993, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.