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Economic Integration and Political Accountability

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Author Info
Sand-Zantman, W.

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Abstract

This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians. Assuming that politicians are controlled by the voters through reelection rules, we analyze to what extent economic integration affects the form of those rules and the efforts made by politicians. We define economic integration by the existence of policies and shocks interdependences between countries. Then, from a political point of view, this integration is shown to be a two-sided phenomenon. Shock-interdependence allows yardstick comparison, increases political accountability and therefore efforts while policy-interdependence induces a lack of responsibility and harms the extent to which politicians can be controlled.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2003.09.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2003.09

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Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Av. de la Mer - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
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Related research
Keywords: POLITICAL ECONOMY ; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ; YARDSTICK COMPETITION;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
P45 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1993. "International Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 93-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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  2. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2001. "Welfare And Macroeconomic Interdependence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 421-445, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Rodrik, Dani, 1998. "Symposium on Globalization in Perspective: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 3-8, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Robert C. Feenstra, . "Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy," Department of Economics 98-06, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Mukand, Sharun W., 2006. "Globalization and the `confidence game'," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 406-427, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Neumeyer, Pablo Andres, 1998. "Currencies and the Allocation of Risk: The Welfare Effects of a Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 246-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Wolfers, Justin, 2002. "Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections," Research Papers 1730, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  2. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Breton, Albert & Ursprung, Heinrich, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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