Economic Integration and Political Accountability
AbstractThis paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians. Assuming that politicians are controlled by the voters through reelection rules, we analyze to what extent economic integration affects the form of those rules and the efforts made by politicians. We define economic integration by the existence of policies and shocks interdependences between countries. Then, from a political point of view, this integration is shown to be a two-sided phenomenon. Shock-interdependence allows yardstick comparison, increases political accountability and therefore efforts while policy-interdependence induces a lack of responsibility and harms the extent to which politicians can be controlled.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2003.09.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Rue Raymond Dugrand - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
More information through EDIRC
POLITICAL ECONOMY ; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ; YARDSTICK COMPETITION;
Other versions of this item:
- Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2004. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Zantman, W., 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers 00-540, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- P45 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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