A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre
AbstractParticipatory Democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both Direct and Representative Democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to understand how Participatory Democracy operates, and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of Participatory Budgeting implemented in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 235.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Participatory Democracy; Retrspective voting; Assembly; Legislator;
Other versions of this item:
- Enriqueta Aragones & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre," ESE Discussion Papers 124, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
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- Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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- Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998.
"Meetings with costly participation,"
mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Pyramidal Democracy," MPRA Paper 3965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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