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Pyramidal Democracy

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Author Info
Pivato, Marcus

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Abstract

We consider a decentralized, multilayered representative democracy, where citizens participate in deliberative policy formation after self-organizing into a pyramidal hierarchy of small groups. Each group elects a delegate, who expresses the deliberative consensus of that group at the next tier of the pyramid. The pyramid thus acts as a communications network which efficiently aggregates useful information and policy ideas. It is also a powerful meritocratic device, which channels legislative responsibility towards the most committed and competent citizens. This yields a practical implementation of deliberative democracy in a large polity.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3965/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3965.

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Date of creation: 10 Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3965

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Related research
Keywords: deliberative democracy

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Deb, Rajat & Kelsey, David, 1987. "On constructing a generalized ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 161-174, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Weber, James S, 1993. " An Elementary Proof of the Conditions for a Generalized Condorcet Paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 415-19, October.
  3. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Enriqueta Aragones & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre," ESE Discussion Papers 124, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  7. McKelvey, Richard D & Schofield, Norman, 1987. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 923-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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