Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
AbstractPrevious analyses have shown that if a point is to be a core of a majority-rul e voting game in Euclidean space when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients at the point must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper, these results are generalized t o the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of the utility gradients of "pivotal' ' coalitions, are obtained. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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