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Voting Paradoxes and MCDM

Author

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  • Hannu Nurmi

    (University of Turku)

  • Tommi Meskanen

    (Turku Centre for Computer Science)

Abstract

Many, if not most, problems in group decision making can be translated into MCDM problems by substituting criteria for voters. Yet, there has been very little discussion about the implications of various types of voting paradoxes to MCDM. The classic voting paradoxes, viz. Borda's and Condorcet's, have obvious implications for certain MCDM situations. The latter implies that the notion of the best alternative, given a set of criteria and information about the ordinal ranking of the alternatives on those criteria, can be essentially arbitrary. The former, in turn, demonstrates a particularly clear case of conflict between reasonable intuitions. Completely unexplored are implications of compound majority paradoxes to MCDM. The paper deals with Ostrogorski's and Anscombe's paradoxes which result from non-bisymmetry and non-associativity of the majority relation. Moreover, we shall discuss the implications of paradox of multiple elections which is a situation where the result of multiple-item election may be a policy alternative that nobody voted for.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannu Nurmi & Tommi Meskanen, 2000. "Voting Paradoxes and MCDM," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 297-313, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:9:y:2000:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1008618017659
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008618017659
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
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    4. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    5. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga & Issofa Moyouwou & Monge Kleber Kamdem Ouambo, 2017. "Avoiding Majority Dissatisfaction on a Series of Majority Decisions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 453-471, May.
    2. Hannu Nurmi, 2001. "Resolving Group Choice Paradoxes Using Probabilistic and Fuzzy Concepts," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 177-199, March.
    3. Aleksandras KRYLOVAS & Natalja KOSAREVA & Edmundas Kazimieras ZAVADSKAS, 2016. "Statistical Analysis of KEMIRA Type Weights Balancing Methods," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(3), pages 19-39, September.
    4. Darmann, Andreas & Grundner, Julia & Klamler, Christian, 2019. "Evaluative voting or classical voting rules: Does it make a difference? Empirical evidence for consensus among voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 345-353.
    5. Manfred J. Holler & Florian Rupp, 2021. "Power in Networks: The Medici," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 59-75, December.

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