A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre
AbstractParticipatory Democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both Direct and Representative Democracy: Citizens have the ultimate power to decide on policy and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to understand how Participatory Democracy operates, and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a formal model inspired in the experience of Participatory Budgeting implemented in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre and that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 124.
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Participatory Democracy; Porto Alegre; assembly; legislator;
Other versions of this item:
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2005. "A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre," Working Papers 235, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
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- Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
- Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998.
"Meetings with costly participation,"
mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Pyramidal Democracy," MPRA Paper 3965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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