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Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States

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  • Fredriksson, Per

    (University of Louisville)

  • Mamun, Khawaja

    ()
    (John F. Welch College of Business, Sacred Heart University)

Abstract

This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ state cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Sacred Heart University, John F. Welch College of Business in its series Working Papers with number 2009003.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:she:wpaper:2009003

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Related research

Keywords: Agricultural tobacco; cigarette taxation; lobbying; reputation-building; electoral accountability; term limits; federalism;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Leonzio Rizzo & Alejandro Esteller - Moré, 2011. "US Excise Tax Horizontal Interdependence: Yardstick vs. Tax Competition," Working Papers 201116, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.

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