Economic integration and political accountability
AbstractThis paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians, In a framework the politicians are only controled through reelection rules, we study the effect of economic integration on the reelection rules chosen by the voters and try to establish a link between economic integration and accountability. We first define economic integration noe only by the existence of externalities between countries but also by the positive correlation of shocks accross the countries. Then, from a political point of view, we show that economic integration is a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, the correlation of shocks allows yardstick comparison which is good for the control of politicians. On the other hand, it induces a lack of responsability because of the existence of externalities. Therefore, the political effect of economic integration depends on the relative strength of those two effects.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Zantman, W., 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers 00-540, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Sand-Zantman, W., 2003. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2003.09, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- P45 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Symposium on Globalization in Perspective: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 3-8, Fall.
- Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 1997.
"Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdependence,"
NBER Working Papers
6307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert C. Feenstra, .
"Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy,"
Department of Economics
98-06, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Robert C. Feenstra, 1998. "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 31-50, Fall.
- Robert Feenstra, 2003. "Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy," Working Papers 986, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Guillaume CHEIKBOSSIAN & Wilfried SAND-ZANTMAN, 2011.
"Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring,"
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,
ENSAE, issue 101-102, pages 327-346.
- Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2001.
"Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
501, CESifo Group Munich.
- Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
- Galina Zudenkova, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," Economics Working Papers we1011, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011.
"A political agency model of coattail voting,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
- Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 657, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.