The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring

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The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring

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Cheikbossian, Guillaume
Sand-Zantman, Wilfried

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Wilfried Sand-Zantman

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 527.

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Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:9498

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2008-10-21 (Game Theory)
NEP-PBE-2008-10-21 (Public Economics)
NEP-URE-2008-10-21 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)

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Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, 2005. "Yardstick competition and political agency problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 155-169, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks, 2001. "Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems," Working Papers 441, Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- BELLEFLAMME, Paul & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2002. "Yardstick competition and political agency problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2002029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Zantman, W., 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers 00-540, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
Other versions:
- Sand-Zantman, W., 2003. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2003.09, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1. [Downloadable!]
- Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2004. "Economic integration and political accountability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1001-1025, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
McMillan, John, 1979. "Individual incentives in the supply of public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Revelli, Federico, 2006. "Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 459-475, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Federico Revelli, 2004. "Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Local Public Goods, Risk Sharing, and Private Information in Federal Systems," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 39-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des MathÃ©matiques Economiques â Document de travail de lâI.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
Other versions:
- Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.

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