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Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle

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Author Info
Le Borgne, Eric (IMF)
Lockwood, Ben (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

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Abstract

We investigate whether relevant private information about citizens’ competence in political office can be credibly revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions, as opposed to choice of policy once in office. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests ; only in the former case can entry be revealing in equilibrium. We apply these results to Rogoff’s (1990) model of the political budget cycle, allowing for candidate entry, as well as elections : as interests are common, low-ability candidates are screened out at the entry stage, and so there is no signaling via fiscal policy (i.e. no “political budget cycle”). In a variant of the Rogoff model where citizens differ in honesty, rather than ability, interests are conflicting, and so the political budget cycle can persist in equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 582.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:582

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Related research
Keywords: Asymmetric Information ; Citizen-Candidate ; Representative Democracy ; Signaling Games ; Political Budget Cycles;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Prat, A., 1997. "Campaign advertising and voter welfare," Discussion Paper 118, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
  6. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers 30-97, Tel Aviv.
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  8. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Leonardo Bartolini & Allan Drazen, 1997. "Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal," NBER Working Papers 5725, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Besley, Timothy J. & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Does Tax Competition Raise Voter Welfare?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Milyo, Jeffrey & Groseclose, Timothy, 1999. "The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 699-722, October.
  12. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  14. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. repec:dgr:uvatin:20040065 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Klaas J. Beniers & Robert A. J. Dur, 2004. "Politicians’ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Costas Roumanias, 2008. "Auctioning Public Office," Discussion Paper Series 2008_08, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
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