Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal

Contents:

Author Info

  • Leonardo Bartolini
  • Allan Drazen

Abstract

We present a model in which a government's current capital controls policy signals future policies. Controls on capital outflows evolve in response to news on technology, conditional on government attitudes towards taxation of capital. When there is uncertainty over government types, a policy of liberal capital outflows sends a favorable signal that may trigger a capital inflow. This prediction is consistent with the experience of several countries that have liberalized their capital account

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5725.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5725.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 138-154
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5725

Note: IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 538, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1991. "International real business cycles," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 146, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Bacchetta, Philippe, 1992. "Liberalization of Capital Movements and of the Domestic Financial System," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(236), pages 465-74, November.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
  5. Aizenman, Joshua & Guidotti, Pablo E., 1994. "Capital controls, collection costs and domestic public debt," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 41-54, February.
  6. Giovannini, Alberto & de Melo, Martha, 1993. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 953-63, September.
  7. Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferrett, 1993. "The Political Economy of Capital Controls," NBER Working Papers 4353, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
  9. Robert J. Barro, 1986. "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 1794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Gordon M. Bodnar & Leonardo Bartolini, 1992. "An Analysis of the Process of Capital Liberalization in Italy," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 92/27, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Frenkel, Jacob A & Razin, Assaf, 1986. "Fiscal Policies in the World Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 564-94, June.
  12. Dooley, Michael P & Isard, Peter, 1980. "Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 370-84, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5725. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.