Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Capital Controls, Collection Costs, and Domestic Public Debt

Contents:

Author Info

  • Joshua Aizenman
  • Pablo E. Guidotti

Abstract

The implications of a large public debt for the implementation of capital controls for an economy where tax revenue collection is costly are examined. Conditions are analyzed under which policymakers will resort to capital controls to reduce the cost of recycling domestic public debt. The linkages between a costly tax collection mechanism, capital controls, am domestic government debt are explored in terms of a two-period m:x1el of optimal taxation. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate haw capital controls are linked to different domestic public debt levels am to different degrees of efficiency in tax-revenue collection.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w3443.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3443.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3443

Note: ITI IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2009. "Globalisation and Developing Countries - a Shrinking Tax Base?," The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 45(5), pages 653-671.
  2. Joshua Aizenman, 2003. "On the Hidden Links Between Financial and Trade Opening," NBER Working Papers 9906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Reisen, Helmut, 1997. "Liberalizing foreign investments by pension funds: Positive and normative aspects," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 1173-1182, July.
  4. Eduardo Siandra, 1999. "La inversión extranjera de los fondos de pensiones y el desarrollo del mercado de capitales doméstico," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0599, Department of Economics - dECON.
  5. Leonardo Bartolini & Allan Drazen, 1996. "Capital account liberalization as a signal," Staff Reports 11, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  6. Joshua Aizenman & Gurnain Kaur Pasricha, 2013. "Why do emerging markets liberalize capital outflow controls? Fiscal versus net capital flow concerns," NBER Working Papers 18879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen Sbrancia, 2011. "The Liquidation of Government Debt," BIS Working Papers 363, Bank for International Settlements.
  8. Huizinga, Harry & Schaling, Eric & van der Windt, Peter C, 2007. "Capital Controls and Foreign Investor Subsidies Implicit in South Africa's Dual Exchange Rate System," CEPR Discussion Papers 6347, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Stefano Battilossi, 2003. "Capital Mobility And Financial Repression In Italy, 1960-1990: A Public Finance Perspective," Working Papers in Economic History wh030602, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones.
  10. Impavido, Gregorio & Musalem, Alberto R. & Vittas, Dimitri, 2002. "Contractual savings in countries with a small financial sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2841, The World Bank.
  11. Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Privatization in Emerging Markets," NBER Working Papers 6524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. William Gissy, 1999. "Treasury bill rates and treasury cash reserves," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(4), pages 435-443, December.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3443

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.