Capital controls, collection costs and domestic public debt
The implications of a large public debt for the implementation of capital controls for an economy where tax revenue collection is costly are examined. Conditions are analyzed under which policymakers will resort to capital controls to reduce the cost of recycling domestic public debt. The linkages between a costly tax collection mechanism, capital controls, am domestic government debt are explored in terms of a two-period m:x1el of optimal taxation. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate haw capital controls are linked to different domestic public debt levels am to different degrees of efficiency in tax-revenue collection.
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- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988.
"External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk,"
NBER Working Papers
2610, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk," Scholarly Articles 4553019, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk," UCLA Economics Working Papers 538, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carlos A. VÃ©gh & Pablo E. Guidotti, 1990. "Optimal Taxation Policies in the EMS: A Two-Country Model of Public Finance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 37(2), pages 311-337, June.
- Barro, Robert J, 1979.
"On the Determination of the Public Debt,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
- Joshua Aizenman, 1983. "Government Size, Optimal Inflation Tax, and Tax Collection Costs," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 103-105, Apr-Jun.
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