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Why do emerging markets liberalize capital outflow controls? Fiscal versus net capital flow concerns

  • Joshua Aizenman
  • Gurnain Kaur Pasricha

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the factors that motivated emerging economies to change their capital outflow controls in the recent decades. Liberalization of capital outflow controls can allow emerging market economies (EMEs) to reduce net capital inflow (NKI) pressures, but may cost their governments the fiscal revenues that external financial repression generates. Our results indicate that external repression revenues in EMEs declined substantially in the 2000's compared with the 1980's. In line with this decline in external repression revenues and their growth accelerations in 2000's, concerns related to net capital inflows took predominance over fiscal concerns in the decisions to liberalize capital outflow controls. Emerging markets facing high volatility in net capital inflows and higher balance sheet exposures liberalized outflows less. Countries eased outflows more in response to higher net capital inflows, higher appreciation pressures in the exchange market, higher real exchange rate volatility and greater accumulation of reserves.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18879.

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Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Aizenman, Joshua & Pasricha, Gurnain Kaur, 2013. "Why do emerging markets liberalize capital outflow controls? Fiscal versus net capital flow concerns," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 28-64.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18879
Note: IFM
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  1. Broner, Fernando & Didier, Tatiana & Erce, Aitor & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2011. "Gross capital flows : dynamics and crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5768, The World Bank.
  2. Patnaik, Ila & Shah, Ajay, 2011. "Did the Indian capital controls work as a tool of macroeconomic policy?," Working Papers 11/87, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
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  7. Reinhart, Carmen & Kirkegaard, Jacob & Sbrancia, Belen, 2011. "Financial repression redux," MPRA Paper 31641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Sebastian Edwards, 2005. "Capital Controls, Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals," NBER Working Papers 11170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Christoph Trebesch & Michael G Papaioannou & Udaibir S. Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 12/203, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Vittorio Grilli & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 1995. "Economic Effects and Structural Determinants of Capital Controls," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(3), pages 517-551, September.
  11. Joshua Aizenman & Pablo E. Guidotti, 1990. "Capital Controls, Collection Costs, and Domestic Public Debt," NBER Working Papers 3443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Michael Hutchison & Gurnain Kaur Pasricha & Nirvikar Singh, 2011. "Effectiveness of Capital Controls in India: Evidence from the Offshore NDF Market," Working Papers 11-29, Bank of Canada.
  13. Ila Patnaik & Ajay Shah, 2012. "Did the Indian Capital Controls Work as a Tool of Macroeconomic Policy?," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 60(3), pages 439-464, September.
  14. Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2006. "Globalization and Developing Countries - A Shrinking Tax Base?," NBER Working Papers 11933, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Martin Schindler, 2009. "Measuring Financial Integration: A New Data Set," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(1), pages 222-238, April.
  16. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521877657 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. repec:cup:cbooks:9781107401440 is not listed on IDEAS
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