This paper evaluates the welfare implications of privatization in emerging market economies, in countries where policies are determined by the median voter. We show that privatization may lead to large efficiency gains by changing the menu of taxes. We illustrate this point with two examples. First, we consider privatization of import competing public enterprises. Reducing the public sector involvement in import competing activities is shown to lower the public sector's benefits from protection, reducing thereby the equilibrium tariff rate. The second example deals with social security privatization in an economy characterized by imperfect capital mobility, where the private sector may engage in capital flight. A small share of the capital owned by the middle class implies that the median voter would impose a tax on capital income that exceeds the efficient tax by a large margin, reflecting the beggar my (capitalist) neighbor' attitude. Social security privatization increases the equity position of the middle class, inducing the median voter to internalize a higher fraction of the costs of high taxes on capital, thereby reducing the capital tax rate. The indirect effects of privatization described in the paper are external to the privatized activity. Hence, these benefits are not accounted for in a conventional cost benefit assessment of the privatized projects. Our examples illustrate that ignoring these effects may lead one to underestimate the potential gains of privatization.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
6524.
Length: Date of creation: Apr 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6524
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
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Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)