We study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping-generations model with short-lived governements. The successive governements -who care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributions- are unable to pre-commit the future course of redistributive taxation. In a stationary politico-economic equilibrium, the tax rate in each period depends on the current state of the economy and all expectations about future political outcomes are fulfilled. We find that there exists multiple stationary equilibria in many political settings. Steady-state welfare is often lower than it would be in the absence of redistributive politics.
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Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H80 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - General H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
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