This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Cukierman, Alex
Meltzer, Allan H

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In the presence of different abilities, and therefore different bequests, some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo-Ricardian world. Such individuals vote for taxes on future generations, through the issuance of bonds, thereby increasing their current consumption. This produces some crowding out of capital, reduces wage rates, and increases the interest rate. As a consequence, even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt. The paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes, social security benefits, and the national debt by majority rule. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198909%2979%3A4%3C713%3AAPTOGD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 79 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 713-32
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:79:y:1989:i:4:p:713-32

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luisa Lambertini, 2001. "Technological Change and Public Financing of Education," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 579, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Maria Manuel Pinho, 2004. "Political models of budget deficits: a literature review," FEP Working Papers 138, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  3. Derek Hung Chiat Chen, 2003. "Intertemporal excess burden, bequest motives, and the budget deficit," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3086, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Do we really need to tame a conservative ECB? When the policy mix matters," Working Papers 18, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 1998. [Downloadable!]
  5. Patrizio Tirelli, 2000. "Revisiting Public Debt and Inflation: Fiscal Implications of an Independent Central Banker," Working Papers 31, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2000. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jukka Lassila & Tarmo Valkonen, 2001. "Ageing, Demographic Risks, and Pension Reform," Discussion Papers 765, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1987. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy," NBER Working Papers 2308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. James A Kahn & Jong-Soo Lim, 2001. "Finite Horizons, Political Economy, and Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 1999. "Is Social Security Really Bad for Growth?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(4), pages 796-819, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Martín Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2005. "Sustaining Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Javier A. Gutierrez & Carolina Guzmán & Ulpiano J. Jiménez, 2000. "Economía política y finanzas públicas: teoría, evidencia y resultados de laboratorio," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 2(3), pages 104-148, July-dece. [Downloadable!]
  13. Michel Aglietta & Merih Uctum, 1995. "Fiscal consolidation in Europe," Research Paper 9519, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  14. Robert Lavigne, 2006. "The Institutional and Political Determinants of Fiscal Adjustment," Working Papers 06-1, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  15. S. Rao Aiyagari & Ellen R. McGrattan, 1997. "The optimum quantity of debt," Staff Report 203, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. James A. Kahn, 1997. "Education, political instability, and growth," Research Paper 9737, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Jorge Soares, . "Altruism and Self-interest in a Political Economy of Public Education," Working Papers 130, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  18. Rowena A. Pecchenino & Patricia S. Pollard, 1995. "The effects of annuities, bequests, and aging in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth," Working Papers 1995-008, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2001. "Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?," Occidental Economics Working Papers 1, Occidental College, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  20. Karin Mayr, 2006. "Optimal budget deficits and immigration," Economics working papers 2006-19, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
  21. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2000. "A Nominal Income Growth Target for a Conservative ECB? When the policy mix matters," Working Papers 32, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  22. Guido Tabellini, 1989. "The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 3058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.