Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: Recent evidence from Spain
AbstractWe analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as indications of the influence wielded by land developer lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003–2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility, with municipalities needing periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. This variable is, however, potentially endogenous, since not only do votes affect policy, but also policy is expected to affect votes. To deal with this problem, we instrument this variable using the votes at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy and votes actually obtained regionally at the same type of election. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 96 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Land use regulations; Urban growth controls; Political economy;
Other versions of this item:
- Albert Sole-Olle & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2010. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain," Working Papers in Economics 248, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2010. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain," Working Papers 2010/45, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
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- Elena Costas & Albert Sole-Olle & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011.
"Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors,"
Working Papers in Economics
255, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Elena Costas-Pérez & Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011. "Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors," Working Papers 2011/9, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2011. "Local spending and the housing boom," Working Papers 2011/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
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