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Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

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  • Albert Sole-Olle
  • Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Sole-Olle & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2010. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain," Working Papers in Economics 248, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010248
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gavoille, Nicolas & Verschelde, Marijn, 2017. "Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the activity of French deputies, 1958–2012," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 180-195.
    2. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2013. "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 42-56.
    3. Elena Costas & Albert Sole-Olle & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011. "Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors," Working Papers in Economics 255, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    4. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2013. "On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 29-43.
    5. Olivier Chanel & Laurence Delattre & Claude Napoléone, 2014. "Determinants of Local Public Policies for Farmland Preservation and Urban Expansion: A French Illustration," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 411-433.
    6. Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, 2014. "Regulation and Housing Supply," NBER Working Papers 20536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dirk Foremny & Jordi Jofre-Monseny & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2015. "'Hold that Ghost': Using Notches to Identify Manipulation of Population-Based Grants," CESifo Working Paper Series 5578, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Delattre, Laurence & Chanel, Olivier & Livenais, Cecile & Napoléone, Claude, 2015. "Combining discourse analyses to enrich theory: The case of local land-use policies in South Eastern France," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 60-75.
    9. Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López & Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2014. "Do Land Use Policies Follow Road Construction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4672, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2012. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: Recent evidence from Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 10-19.
    11. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2011. "Local spending and the housing boom," Working Papers 2011/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    12. Martin, Thorsten, 2017. "You shall not build! (until tomorrow) [:] Electoral cycles and housing policies in Germany," MPRA Paper 78998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul, 2016. "Clean money, dirty system: Connected landowners capture beneficial land rezoning," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 99-114.
    14. Sebastian Garmann, 2014. "The causal effect of coalition governments on fiscal policies: evidence from a Regression Kink Design," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(36), pages 4490-4507, December.
    15. Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2014. "Does Corruption Erode Trust in Government? Evidence from a Recent Surge of Local Scandals in Spain," CESifo Working Paper Series 4888, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Grażyna Bukowska & Joanna Siwińska-Gorzelak, 2016. "Can fiscal decentralisation curb fiscal imbalances?," Working Papers 2016-35, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    17. Garcia-López, Miquel-Àngel & Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2015. "Does zoning follow highways?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 148-155.
    18. Martin, Thorsten & Arnold, Felix & Freier, Ronny, 2015. "(Not) in my backyard? The impact of citizen initiatives on housing supply in Germany," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112952, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul, 2015. "Clean Money in a Dirty System: Relationship Networks and Land Rezoning in Queensland," IZA Discussion Papers 9028, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    20. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2013. "The Influence Wielded by Land Developer Lobbies During the Housing Boom: Recent Evidence From Spain," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(2), pages 43-49, 07.
    21. Costas-Pérez, Elena & Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2012. "Corruption scandals, voter information, and accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 469-484.
    22. Gyourko, Joseph & Molloy, Raven, 2015. "Regulation and Housing Supply," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Elsevier.
    23. repec:eee:pubeco:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:49-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Thorsten Martin & Felix Arnold & Ronny Freier, 2015. "(Not) in my backyard? The impact of citizen initiatives on housing supply in Germany," ERSA conference papers ersa15p462, European Regional Science Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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