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Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy

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Author Info
Svaleryd, Helena () (Research Institute of Industrial Economics)
Vlachos, Jonas () (Stockholm University)

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Abstract

A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both increased political competition and increased local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 698.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: 16 Feb 2007
Date of revision: 26 Mar 2008
Publication status: Forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0698

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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
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Related research
Keywords: Accountability; Political Competition; Media; Political Rents;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2004. "The power of information : evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3239, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001. "An Empirical Investigation of the Strategic Use of Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 570-583, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. AlÌcia Adserý, 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 445-490, October.
    Other versions:
  14. Besley, Timothy J. & Persson, Torsten & Sturm, Daniel M, 2005. "Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 5138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Rudiger Ahrend, 2002. "Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers 2002-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
  17. Di Tella, Rafael & Fisman, Raymond, 2004. "Are Politicians Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 477-513, October.
    Other versions:
  18. Johansson, Eva, 2003. "Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 883-915, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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