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Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy

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  • Svaleryd, Helena
  • Vlachos, Jonas

Abstract

A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both increased political competition and increased local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 93 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (April)
Pages: 355-372

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:3-4:p:355-372

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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Keywords: Accountability Political competition Media Political rents;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Che-Yuan Liang, 2013. "Is there an incumbency advantage or cost of ruling in proportional election systems?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 259-284, March.
  2. Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James, 2009. "Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?," Memorandum 16/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  3. Elena Costas & Albert Sole-Olle & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011. "Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors," Working Papers in Economics 255, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  4. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2012. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: Recent evidence from Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 10-19.
  5. Folke, Olle & Persson, Torsten & Rickne, Johanna, 2014. "Preferential Voting, Accountability and Promotions into Political Power: Evidence from Sweden," Working Paper Series 1002, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  6. Folke, Olle & Rickne, Johanna, 2012. "Female Representation but Male Rule? Party Competition and the Political Glass Ceiling," Working Paper Series 923, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  7. Marcus Drometer, 2012. "Bureaucrats and short-term politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 149-163, April.
  8. Bernecker, Andreas, 2013. "Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament," Working Papers 13-09, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  9. J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  10. Costas-Pérez, Elena & Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2012. "Corruption scandals, voter information, and accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 469-484.

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