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Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fiva, Jon H. () (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)
Natvik, Gisle James () (Norges Bank)
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We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers’ re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects the incumbents’ investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between physical capital and flow variables in government production.
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number
16/2009.
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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 15 Aug 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_016Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway Phone: 22 85 51 27 Fax: 22 85 50 35 Email: Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Rhiana Bergh-Seeley).
Keywords: Political Economics ; Strategic Capital Accumulation ; Identifying Popularity Shocks ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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